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INTRODUCTION

Environmental law in the 1990s has taken new directions.
On the international front, global warming, acid rain, biodiversity, sustainability, and the 1992 Earth Summit are a few of the
more pressing concerns. Domestically, between President
Bush's "environmental administration" and Vice President
Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, Environmental Protection
• Dean and Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The
paper is based on a speech delivered at the Twenty-First Annual Conference on the
Environment hosted by the ABA Standing Committee on Environmental Law at
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 15-17, 1992. I thank my colleague John Applegate for his
careful reading of, and his helpful comments on, this article.
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Agency (EPA) Administrator William K. Reilly had his hands
full. Indeed, two currents of environmental law cannot be
denied: (1) environmental law is inextricably tied into international arenas, l and (2) environmental law is focusing more on
the efficiency aspects of environmental regulation than ever
before. 2
The efficiency move may mean that environmental law and
regulation are finally catching up to Chicago-style laissez-faire
thinking, or it may be the last remnant of the Reagan Revolution. In either case, the contemporary, committed environmentalist must consider the consequences of environmental
regulation on economic development. The move to international
conventions, transboundary problems, and global solutions is
simply a recognition of the reality of the transnational interdependencies between natural resources, energy, the environment,
and the world economy. These changes in orientation from
stewardship to cost-risk-benefit analysis and from the domestic
to the international scene are deeply significant and cannot be
ignored.
Still, there is yet another dramatic phenomenon in environmental law in the 1990s that may well signal the emergence of a
unique way of thinking about environmental law and policy.
Until recently, the only substantial environmental equity issue
was generally viewed in the context of transgenerational justice. 3
1. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA
(1992); LESTER BROWN ET AL., THE STATE OF THE WORLD (1984-92) (describing the
global environment with strategic recommendations); LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1990) (examining global
environmental movement and international environmental cooperation); ORGANIZATION
FOR EcONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEV., THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1991)
(recognizing worldwide economical and ecological interdependence and the need for global
environmental improvement); UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV.,
OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (attempting to formulate a global agenda for environmental
change in order to achieve worldwide sustainable growth).
2. The literature on tradeable emission permits is perhaps the clearest example of
market-based environmental laws. See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 345-77 (3d ed. 1991); Robert W. Hahn
& Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons/or Theory and Practice, 16 EcOLOGY
L.Q. 361, 368-96 (1989); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). In addition, the political rhetoric
of the Bush Administration emphasized the linkages between environmental protection,
energy efficiency, and economic development. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL
ENERGY STRATEGY: POWERFUL IDEAS FOR AMERICA 2-3 (1st ed. 1991-92).
3. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1-3,
17-46 (1989).
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Today, environmental equity also includes an analysis of the
adverse effects of environmental regulation, or the lack thereof,
on disempowered citizens. 4 Although this paper will examine
domestic issues, international organizations are also wary of
human rights abuses in environmental regulation. 5
If you asked someone at least a decade ago if any area of the
law is free of bias, I would imagine that environmental law
would have been a likely candidate. After all, efforts to remove
pollution from land, air, and water could only inure to the benefit of the collective citizenry. Clean air and water, as any economist will tell you, are the quintessential public goods. Indeed,
some environmental laws could even be seen as pro-poor. For
example, low income individuals could benefit disproportionately from the strict enforcement of clean air laws, but this
potential pro-poor disposition is largely theoretical. 6
Upon further review, a contemporary policy analyst accustomed to the ways of the micro economic model might admit
that the effects of certain types of environmental regulation, (the
placement of hazardous waste facilities, for example) might disproportionately impact the poor because it is economically prudent to locate facilities where land is the cheapest. The harsh
reality of this strategy is that poor people are more likely to live
in poorer sections of the country; thus, the likelihood of being
closer to such a facility is higher than that of the general populace. Thus, under this hypothesis, environmental equity is classbased and dictated by economic considerations. Racial implications would, therefore, depend on a correlation between race and
poverty.7
If this were a true picture of the world, there would be
cause enough for concern. To remedy this situation, regulation
could, for example, require that the cost of placing such facilities
encompass the cost to the surrounding communities. Such regu4. See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. & Dennis Rivera, Pollution's Chie/Victims: The
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at A15.
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
DEFENDING THE EARTH: ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT iii-vii
(1992).
6. See Joseph P. Tomain, Distributional Consequences 0/ Environmental Regulation:
Economics, Politics, and Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 101, 10608 (1991).
7. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL
POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992) (arguing moral obligation to
distribute goods and services more equally in America).
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lation would be justified on efficiency grounds by requiring facility owners to account for externalities and incorporate social
costs into the price of their services. Furthermore, such regulation would be equitable, as environmental harms and benefits
could be distributed free of class bias.
Unfortunately, this picture of class inequity is only partial.
Environmental inequity also entails racial discrimination.
Recent studies reveal that, even when an analyst accounts for
class bias, environmental programs have had a disproportionately adverse impact on racial minorities. 8 This race bias cannot
be discounted and the scholars who have revealed its existence
have significantly changed the way we must think about environmental regulation in particular and social regulation in general.
This paper attempts to answer the following question: Why
does environmental regulation show class and race bias? In
answering that question, this paper argues that both structural
and systemic problems pervade environmental decisionmaking
and contribute to disadvantaging the dis empowered.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The environmental equity problems of class bias and racial
bias have a common structure and a common source. Perhaps it
is not too much to hope that they may also share a common
solution. The common structure results from the inability of diffuse and relatively powerless groups to participate in environmental decisionmaking and policymaking processes. The
common source of these problems is the failure of the political
economy to overcome the barriers to participation. The pro8. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 38-43 (1990); CoMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 13-22
(1987); 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA]; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SmNG OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNmES
1-5 (June 1983); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, THE TRUTH ABoUT WHERE You LIVE: AN
ATLAS FOR ACTION ON TOXINS AND MORTALITY ch. 6 (1991); Regina Austin & Michael
Schill, Black, Brown, Poor, & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the
QuestJor Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69,69-71 (1991); Kelly M. Colquette &
Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and
Commendations, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 158-62 (1991); R. George Wright, Hazardous
Waste Disposal and the Problems oj Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777,
791-99 (1991); Roger D. Colton, A Case Study in Environmental and Poverty Conflict:
Auto Replacements as a Clean Air Strategy (Apr. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
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posed common solution is to restructure the political process to
allow more meaningful participation-to allow more voice9 in
the environmental regulatory process. This inclusion can occur
at the agency level (through appointments)10 or through grass
roots activism. 11 This paper suggests wider participation in
rulemaking and decisionmaking processes.
There is a direct connection between the common structure
and the common source of environmental equity problems, and
they can be usefully discussed together. Moreover, former EPA
General Counsel E. Donald Elliott succinctly made this point:
Standard economic and public choice theory would predict
that groups that are less powerful politically and economically
would be more likely to be exposed to disamenities of all types.
In any event, in this instance, those who are least able to defend
themselves through the political and economic system are more
likely to bear the brunt of the harms of pollution. 12

By elaborating on Professor Elliott's quotation, I intend to
show that the disempowerment of certain groups and the resultant environmental inequities are the consequences of four failures of the political economy: (1) economic, (2) political, (3)
constitutional, and (4) legal. The thesis is that before the voice
of certain groups (i.e. racial minorities and the poor) can be
heard by environmental policymakers, government regulation
must be responsive to those failures.
I can state my thesis in one word: politics. Environmental
equity is fundamentally an issue of regulatory politics. Simply
stated, environmental equity is about distributive justice and, in
particular, the distribution of environmental harms and benefits.
As a preface to the discussion of the "four failures," we
must recognize both the polycentric structure 13 of environmental
9. See ALBERT o. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, LoYALTY: REsPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 120-26 (1970).
10. See 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECfION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNmES 69-71 (June, 1992).
11. Luke W. Cole, Correspondence: Remedies for Environmental Racism: a View
from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991, 1996-97 (1992); Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 426-27 (1991).
12. E. Donald Elliott, Jr., A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional
Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 7
(1991).
13. See. e.g., Milton R. Wessel, SCIENCE AND CONSC1ENCE 4-10 (1980); Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 395 (1978). See
generally ROBERT F. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 187-219 (1982)
(discussing the ethics of nuclear power).
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disputes and the dynamic flow of environmental laws over the
past two decades from stewardship to sustainability and from a
problem-specific focus to global monitoring; from this we can
readily see that environmental law is not a static concept. 14 The
structure and the dynamics of environmental law provide two
lessons. First, environmental disputes are complex and costly
due to such complexity. Groups with limited or no resources
cannot compete effectively in the process. Second, one must
realize that to discuss environmental regulation and distributive
justice in one breath is to paint too grand a picture. Rather,
environmental problems must be disaggregated and discussed
with specificity to recognize that the distributional issues cut
many ways.
We must not assume that all minority communities,
whether referring to the urban poor or the Native Americans of
this country or the indigenous peoples of developing countries,
share the majority view of environmentalism. Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental protection is acceptable as long
as it does not detract from economic productivity. A cruel variant of this theme is that it is easier (and cheaper) to provide for
environmental protection if there is less invested in economic
production (i.e. let deyeloped areas or countries produce and let
developing and undeveloped areas or countries protect). The
direct domestic consequence of this conventional wisdom is that
the poor sections of urban and rural economies suffer the effects
of pollution in the name of economic production, while the
wealthy sections provide environmental protection under the
guise of green spaces. The dominant view is too crude. Benefits
and harms are distributed unevenly among rich and poor, developed and developing countries, different generations, and
according to particular environmental problems.
Both the polycentric structure of environmental problems
and the dynamic status of environmental law contribute to the
disadvantages suffered by disenfranchised groups; they also suggest a particular regulatory response. The problem may best be
addressed by a political process solution (rather than through a
substantive command and control standard) or a directive to
decisionmakers to consider equity issues in their cost (risk)-benefit analyses.
14. See Mark Sagoff, The Great Environmental Awakening, 9 AMERICAN PROSPEcr,
39, 42-44 (1992).
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THE FOUR F AlLURES

Relative to the benefits and burdens of environmental regulation, the political economy has disadvantaged these groups in
four more or less specific, yet complementary, ways. At the bottom, the failures are those of four social institutions: the legislature, the market, the court, and the agency. Parenthetically,
one could easily substitute the executive for the agency, thus
covering all three constitutional branches.
Obviously, it is rather audacious to suggest in a short paper
that, not only our market economy, but our entire governmental
system is deficient in matters of distributive justice. I agree.
Such a statement is audacious, but also true. Small, focused
interest groups can outmaneuver larger, diffuse groups in both
economic and political markets, and the law reinforces this
disequilibrium.

A.

Failure One-Political Failure

The current dominant view of the legislative process is that
legislation is the outcome of a political bargaining process in
which "deals" are struck by competing interest groups. IS Thus,
if small, focused, well-financed groups can out-lobby large, diffuse groups, then legislative deals will, of course, favor the more
organized special interest groups. The favored, special interest
groups thus, "get a seat at the table" because they are largely
responsible for setting that very table. 16
Failure in the political marketplace derives directly from
interest group theory. Because interest groups will form when
the benefits to be gained by the members are greater than the
transaction costs of organizing, smaller interest groups are more
likely to coalesce. Larger groups are harder to organize and
more susceptible to numerous "free rider" problems. I? In addition, broad groups tend to be concerned about nonmonetary
harms, such as low-level toxic risk. 18 For example, there are
market disincentives for a large unorganized group (such as "the
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 37-56
(1988).

16. See id. at 61-93 (for a critique of interest group theory).
17. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE

ACTION: PUBLIC

GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1965).

18. See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, In/ormation, and Regulatory
Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992).
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poor") to organize in opposition to the placement of a hazardous
waste facility.19
In the political marketplace, small, well-financed interest
groups out-lobby diffuse groups with notable regularity. Consider the politics of your own workplace. Small vocal groups,
particularly if they register their interest with a focused intensity, will set policy over less intense or less vocal larger groups.
The obvious defect in this design of majoritarian politics (a
defect well known to Madison, by the way),2° is that diffuse
interest groups or factions will go underrepresented or unrepresented. The direct consequence of successful lobbying is the
effectuation of wealth transfers from one group to another, as
groups lobby to either capture benefits or to avoid burdens
through the placement of legal entitlements.
A partial democratic response to this form of political failure in the legislature is the notion that government agencies
"guard" the public interest. Administrative agencies, the delegated authorities of the democratic will of the legislature, are, in
theory, formed to protect the public interest. This response is
not wholly satisfactory for two reasons. First, the legislative
deal may either be silent about or even negatively affect an
already disadvantaged interest group. If so, then the agency is
legislatively directed by the legislation to work against the interests of the disadvantaged group. Second, if a disempowered
interest group has been "cut out of the deal," then agency officials cannot assess either a critique or a proposal made by parties
with no seat at the table.

B.

Failure Two-Economic Failure

As previously noted, in addition to distributing regulatory
benefits and burdens, legislation has the direct consequence of
placing legal entitlements on favored interest groups. The initial
placement of legal entitlements legislatively empowers interest
groups and dramatically affects "the players" in the "regulatory
or judicial games" that remain to be played in the political process. To better understand how the initial placement of legal
entitlements affects the winners and the losers in the legislative
game, we must discuss economic failure.
Environmental economics derives more from the subdis19. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 8, at 162-70.
20. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

HeinOnline -- 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 8 1992-1993

1992]

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

9

cipline of welfare economics than from the classical or neoclassical economic variants. 21 Still, at least in the case of air emissions
trading, we tum our attention to the micro economic model for
some environmental regulation. Thus, it is fair to say that both
neoclassical and welfare economics drive environmental
regulation.
Both models have their virtues. When the conditions of the
neoclassical model are satisfied (i.e. when the market has a large
number of buyers and sellers, product homogeneity, and "perfect" information), then the market obtains its considerable virtues. 22 The well-functioning neoclassical market reaches an
equilibrium at which the proper quantity of goods are produced
at the proper prices, producer profit and consumer welfare are
maximized, wealth is created, technological innovation is
encouraged, and, as an added political attraction, individual liberty and equality are furthered (because each dollar counts as
one vote, as choice is also maximized).23 In other words, more is
better because the pie is bigger.
Given these virtues, it would then seem that "the market,"
rather than government regulation, should produce the "proper"
amount of pollution or non-pollution at the proper prices.
Welfare economics, in distinction, has a different focus. It
assumes that initial starting points are unequal (as the playing
field is not level for all buyers and sellers), that there are effects
beyond the boundaries of the self-contained market, and that
government affects markets. Indeed, a central tenet of welfare
economics is that, in addition to establishing market prices, market transactions produce social costS.24 Consequently, efforts to
enhance efficiency may be furthered at the cost of distributional
imbalances and some entity (i.e. the government) must make dis21. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 7-13 (2d ed. 1988); HANDBOOK OF NATURAL REsOURCE AND
ENERGY EcONOMICS 3-59 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985); JOHN V.
KRUTILLA & ANTHONY C. FISHER, THE EcONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 3-16
(2d ed. 1985); JOHN PEET, ENERGY AND THE EcOLOGICAL ECONOMICS OF
SUSTAINABILITY (1992).
22. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & JAMES E. HICKEY, JR., ENERGY LAW & POLICY 24-26
(1989).

23. See, e.g., SIDNEY
ch. 5 (1993).

A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW &

POLICY,

24. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, EcONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 536 (2d ed. 1982).

HeinOnline -- 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 9 1992-1993

10

TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

tributional decisions. 25 Accordingly, if the "free" market causes
inequitable distributional consequences, then government intervention into that market is justified, and welfare economics provides an analytic model for evaluating the market and for
suggesting regulatory responses.
The seminal discussion of the efficiency and distributional
consequences of the placement of legal entitlements derives from
the work of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase. (Coase authored the
essential article of the law and economics movement in 1960.)26
A simple formulation of the Coase Theorem states: "If there are
zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless
of the choice of legal rule."27 Simply stated, the initial placement of a legal entitlement .is irrelevant for efficiency purposes.
In other words, law does not matter. Rather, bargainers will
contract around problems in their best economic self-interest.
This theorem can be easily demonstrated numerically.28
If, for example, legislation permits the location of a hazardous waste facility upon the satisfaction of certain environmental
conditions, then we can say that, upon the satisfaction of these
conditions, the project sponsor has a legal entitlement to place
that facility. Following the Coase Theorem, if the location of
the facility is unacceptable (Le. too costly) to the neighbors, then
the neighbors will buyout the project sponsor and the facility
will be relocated.
This application of the Coase Theorem is unrealistic in two
respects. First, it neglects the existence of the political failure
just discussed. Instead, the Coase Theorem starts with the
assumption that the initial placement of the legal entitlement is
neutral. It is this exact proposition that is disproved by interest
group theory. Interest groups would neither form nor negotiate
for legislative "deals" if there are no benefits to be had. Second,
the distribution of resources is not and has never been even. Nor
has there ever been an "original position"29 from which an
acceptable allocation of benefits and burdens has flowed.
Still, the Coase Theorem is powerful and useful. For me,
25. See, e.g., Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 889, 890-93 (J. Eatwell et al. ed8., 1987).
26.
27.
(1983).
28.
29.

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 12
TOMAIN & HICKEY,

supra note 22, at 40-48.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971),
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the beauty of the theorem lies in the corollaries and not in the
theorem itself. There are two primary corollaries. First, given
transaction costs, the initial placement of a legal entitlement
may affect the efficiency of a transaction. If the transaction costs
are high or unequal between the parties, then the wrong placement of the legal entitlement may preclude the attainment of
efficient bargains. Also, efficient bargains may not be reached if
one or both parties engage in opportunistic or strategic
bargaining.
Second, the initial placement of entitlements affects the distribution of wealth. Simply stated, law matters-especially with
regard to distributive justice. Regarding the location of a hazardous waste facility, it matters whether the project sponsor has
a legal entitlement to locate the facility or whether the neighbors
have a legal entitlement to force a relocation. Transfer payments
will go to the party with the legal entitlement, thus effectuating a
redistribution of wealth.
These economic ideas are central to a discussion of distributive justice precisely because of the now familiar reasons that the
marketplace does not internalize all of its social costs, marketplace transactions spill over into society and cause harm, and the
distributions of costs and benefits are uneven.
Thus far, we have seen that poorly organized or unorganized groups are placed at a double disadvantage. First, they are
likely to lose the legislative game, thus suffering a political failure. Second, they suffer economic failure because access to
wealth empowers groups to play in the legislative arena and
secure legal entitlements.
Unfortunately, these political and economic failures are further compounded by law, as the have-nots are disadvantaged by
constitutional and legal failures.
C

Failure Three-Constitutional Failure

Exascerbating the political and economic imbalance is an
asymmetrical distribution of constitutional rights. In the regulatory arena, the key actors are the regulator and the regulatee.
As the affected party, the regulatee usually has statutory standing before the agency. Moreover, should the regulator impinge
on either the liberty or property interests of the regulatee, then,
in addition to statutory claims, the regulatee can assert Fifth
Amendment takings and due process arguments, as well as
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Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
claims. 30 In the area of environmental law, one scholar has written that some environmental statutory rights take on constitutional weightY
Affected third parties do not have such extensive constitutional protections. First, third parties are not assured of statutory standing. Third party standing, based on a constitutional
procedural due process claim, is weak or non-existent. Second,
once legislation is passed, regulation is proposed or implemented, and benefits or burdens are distributed, affected disenfranchised third parties may make a general claim that equal
protection has been violated or that the regulation is unreasonable. To claim an equal protection violation, however, requires
that the claimants demonstrate not only discrimination in fact,
but discriminatory intent must also actually be shown before
relief is available. 32 To compound that problem, the range of
judicial scrutiny of environmental equal protection claims has
been restrictive. 33
On the substantive due process side, so long as regulation
satisfies a "basic rationality" test, then the persons adversely
affected by the regulation have little chance for relief. 34 Once
again, the organizing problems for diffuse interests in the legislative arena are legitimized by a narrow scope of equal protection
review and an expansive scope of substantive due process deference. Furthermore, access to agencies expands and contracts
with the law of standing and the current Supreme Court seems
to be undergoing a contraction. 3s
30. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 23 (at ch. 3).
31. AMAN, supra note 1, at 29.
32. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239-45 (1976).
33. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (B.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.
Supp. 880, 884-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajf'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979), ajf'd, 782
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
34. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (B.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.
Supp. 880, 884-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajf'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979), ajf'd, 782
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753-58 (1982)
(rational basis test under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) (rational basis test).
35. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory:
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Failure Four--Legal Failure

1. Common Law Failure
A refinement of the Coase Theorem arrived in a groundbreaking article by Calabresi and Melamed,36 in which the
authors suggest that further analysis shows the importance of
whether a liability rule or a property rule is used and where a
legal entitlement is placed since the available remedies will affect
the distributional and efficiency consequences of that placement.
The use of a property rule can stop a project with an injunction,
and the use of a liability rule can afford compensation. Thus,
depending on which party is assigned the legal entitlement, both
liability and property rules affect the distribution of wealth and
can also affect efficiency. If the surrounding populace can stop
the location of a waste facility through an injunction or demand
compensation through a damages award, then, if the facility
owner wants to operate the plant, there will be a payment of
some amount to such individuals. The amount of the payment
(or the gains from trade) will depend on whether property or
liability rules are applied.
The essential problem with liability and property rules is
that they derive from a common-law, private property baseline37 and do not easily or adequately account for social costs or
future effects. Property and liability rules are more easily
applied to discrete, past disputes involving relatively few parties. 38 Nuisance suits, for example, involve difficult evidentiary
and burden of proof issues, require technical expertise, and freThe Tug 0/ War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 677-78 (1992) ("Courts
tend to grant standing to those groups that were excluded from the original deal ....")
with Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632-35 (1992); Hallstrom v.
Tillamook City, 493 U.S. 20, 25-33 (1989); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). (The Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations of citizen
suit provisions in environmental statutes).
36. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View o/the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-93 (1972).
37. See RICHARD EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN vii-x (1985); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 13-18,210-20 (1990).
38. Class actions, institutional or structural lawsuits, and impact litigation are, of
course, counter examples. See, e.g., PAUL MAcAvoy, INDUSTRY REGULATION AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 5 (1992) ("While not perfect, the legal
framework works so much better in the 1990s than when regulation was initiated in the
1890s or 1930s that it has become a much more attractive alternative to regulatory controls
and practices."). Still, common law principles, as distinct from government regulation, are
better applied retrospectively than prospectively.
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quently yield limited outcomes. In other words, in an area as
complex as the environment, regulatory controls offer a more
comprehensive regulatory regime than judicial supervision.
Moreover, even with the availability of class actions and the
promise of large contingency fees, the disempowered lack the
resources to initiate legal action and few attorneys accept such
cases. 39
2.

Agency Failure

To the extent that the legislative process imperfectly represents the interests of some groups over others, those imperfections reappear in administrative agencies. Without adequate
public participation, agencies are poor guardians of the public
interest for two reasons. First, since agencies are delegatees of
congressional action, they simply reproduce the deals cut
through the legislative process. Second, agencies are subject to
capture by the regulatee. 40 The interest groups that can plausibly capture the EPA, such as Waste Management, BrowningFerris, the Sierra Club, or the Nature Conservancy, are not
inherently responsive to the environmental needs of minorities
or the poor.
Thus, given these four reasons-economic failure, political
failure, constitutional failure, and legal failure-we must ask: Is
government regulation justified? If so, what sort of regulation is
responsive?41

IV.

A REGULATORY REsPONSE
Regulatory analysis posits that the market is preferable to
government regulation. However, if the market is either inefficient or unfair, then government regulation may cure the defect.
Moreover, the identification of the specific market defect also
suggests the proper regulatory response. 42 The political and economic failures of environmental regulation demonstrate that not
39. See Cole, supra note 11, at 1992 & n.3.
40. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-60 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Theories .
ofEconomic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). See generally George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)
(explaining influence of regulatees in creating regulations).
41. See generally Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal Rights and
Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 101 (1991) (analyzing
remedies for toxic waste dump problems from the local to the international level).
42. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 23 (manuscript at ch. 1).
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only are disempowered groups disadvantaged in the legislative
process, but also that that disadvantage is reproduced in the regulatory process and is compounded by law. Moreover, each of
these reciprocal failures have the consequence of diminishing or
silencing the participatory voice of those least able to help themselves. In other words, these four failures of the political economy all dictate a political process solution.
In February 1992, the EPA Environmental Equity Workgroup published a draft list of findings and recommendations,
most of which focus on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of better information and data about the distributional consequences of environmental regulation. 43 Calls for more study
and information are properly cautious and may both confirm
and reveal other instances of environmental racism. Furthermore, the accumulation of more scientific information and
knowledge can help institutionalize a regulatory response to
problems of environmental equity. Indeed, basing a response on
scientific knowledge establishes a common language for
reform. 44
Still, I am skeptical that a "techno-rational" response to
matters of distributive justice is sufficient. 4s If the data reasonably leads to the conclusion that environmental laws generally
or that the location of hazardous waste facilities in particular
disproportionately affect minorities, then more data collection is
not responsive. The problem is, essentially, political, not technical; thus, a political solution is necessary.
If the call for more data collection and analysis is helpful,
though not responsive, to the four failures, then what is? The
short answer is wider public participation. 46 Somehow, a seat at
43. EPA, supra note 8, at 6. The recommendations are that the EPA should do the
following: (1) Increase the priority of environmental equity, (2) collect data and
information to assess risk by income and race, (3) incorporate environmental equity into
risk assessment, (4) identify and target opportunities to reduce high concentrations of risk
to different population groups, (5) assess and consider the distribution of projected risk
reduction in major rulemakings, (6) review permitting, granting, monitoring, and
enforcement processes for their impact on environmental equity, (7) improve
communication with racial minorities and the poor, and (8) incorporate environmental
equity into long-term planning. Id.
44. See AMAN, supra note 1, at 138-42.
45. See also Robert D. Bullard, Comments on the Draft EPA Environmental Equity
Report (on file with author) (discussing EPA's failure to address "institutionalized racial
discrimination").
46. See Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster? 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 272-82 (1991).
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the regulatory table must be given to those currently absent.
There are two basic governmental responses to this situation. First, the government can establish an agency to serve as a
surrogate advocate for the disempowered. 47 Such an agency can
provide technical, scientific, and legal resources so that the poor
and racial minorities can exercise their voice in environmental
decisionmaking and policymaking processes through proxies or
through selected attorneys. Second, these processes can be
opened up to the disadvantaged for their active, direct participation (beyond ordinary notice and comment participation). One
way to accomplish this is through an agency's use of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, although ADR is not
without problems and failures of its own.
The increased use of ADR by the EPA is a particularly
appropriate solution to the insufficient political participation
problem for three timely reasons. First, third party standing
before administrative agencies is fundamentally statutory (not
constitutional) and passing legislation is both costly and risky.
Second, as previously mentioned, the Court's recent glosses on
statutory standing have been restrictive. Third, and most importantly, recent legislation authorizes administrative agencies to
effectively expand participation in ADR programs on their own
without the need for statutory permission.
ADR, in general, refers to methods of dispute resolution
and conflict management other than litigation. In November,
1990, the Administrative Procedure Act was amended by the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Acr8 and the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990.49 Although ADR techniques have
been widely used inside and outside administrative agencies,
these new federal laws eliminate ambiguity concerning the
authority of agencies to utilize such methods.
A.

Administrative Dispute Resolution Act

The ADR Act is the more generic of the two statutes,
directing agencies to adopt a policy concerning the use of ADR
in adjudications, rulemakings, enforcement actions, licensing
47. See, e.g., Department of Public Advocate Act of 1974, Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27E-1 to
52:27E-47 (West 1986 & West Supp. 1992).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-93)
(Supp. III 1991).
49. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-90)
(Supp. III 1991).
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procedures, and other agency actions. Agencies are further
directed to appoint and train ADR specialists in the theory and
practice of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and related techniques. In addition to these techniques, agencies are authorized
to use conciliation, facilitation, fact-finding, mini-trials, or any
combination of ADR methods. The purpose behind ADR is to
avoid costly, polarizing, and time-consuming litigation in favor
of more efficient, participatory, and creative dispute resolution
procedures. Through ADR, the parties to a dispute playa more
active role in facilitating its resolution in lieu of the winner-takeall aspect of the adversary system.

B.

Negotiated Rulemaking Act

Much agency activity is accomplished through legislationlike rulemaking proceedings. Formal and informal rulemaking
has adversarial characteristics which can lead to expensive and
time-consuming litigation and appeals. Because rulemaking is
forward-looking and polycentric (that is, rulemaking often
involves several parties with various interests), structured negotiation is a method that can reduce the time and expense of a
rulemaking proceeding. Through negotiated rulemaking (or
"reg-neg"), so the affected parties can participate in the development of the rule, share information and technical knowledge,
and increase the acceptability of the outcome.
The central feature of reg-neg is "to bring together representatives of the agency and the various interest groups to negotiate the text of a proposed rule."s1 The initial attraction of regneg is that the parties most likely to be affected by an agency's
rule help draft the rule. As the parties will have an earlier and
better idea of how they will be affected by the rule, increased
compliance should result.
The agency, however, must be careful to bring the right
"interested parties" to the table. While industry representatives
may have the wherewithal to participate in reg-neg, individual
consumers, small groups, and grass roots public interest groups
may not have sufficient resources to participate effectively. In
50. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure of Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1, 28-31 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625, 1630-46 (1986).
51. ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCE BOOK 1 (1990).
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such a case, an agency must provide resources to make participation meaningful.
Thus, while ADR generally and reg-neg particularly, offer
promises of more creative solutions and more democratic participation, they also warrant caution on two fronts. First, ADR
may magnify the disparity in resources among various interest
groups unless provisions are made for information (especially
technical information) to be available to the participants. Second, reg-neg may well expand the policymaking role of administrative agencies, raising the specter of the nondelegation
doctrine, as the affected parties help write the rules to govern
themselves. S2
C.

Evaluating ADR

The ADRS3 movement has much to commend it. ADR
methods are flexible and applicable to a range of matters. In the
regulatory arena, ADR is being used on many fronts (especially
environmental regulation). ADR can be responsive to the four
failures, especially if outreach is active and technical support is
made available. Although ADR cannot remake the legislative
"deal," it can enable the agency to more adequately fulfill its
charge to regulate in the public interest. With outreach and
resources, participation can be meaningful, can overcome economic and regulatory failure, and can overcome legal failure at
the agency level.
Extrajudicial forms of dispute resolution promise to be
cheaper, quicker, more participatory, and more creative than litigation. Moreover, if the outcomes are, indeed, crafted by the
disputants, then a high compliance rate for ADR settlements
may follow. Determining whether these promises are fulfilled
requires an ADR evaluation.
Efficiency, effectiveness, and efficacy are the standards used
to define quality in ADR. Efficiency is equated with cost savings, while effectiveness denotes user satisfaction and compliance. Although there is little consensus regarding the efficiency
of mediation, there is general agreement regarding its effectiveness, where "effective" is defined as achieving settlement in a
52. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-41 (1935),
the Supreme Court was critical of the National Industrial Recovery Act for delegating too
much authority to the President and, in turn, to the industry.
53. See Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Model of Court-Annexed Mediation, 5
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 1, 1-18 (1989).
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high percentage of cases without compromising the quality of
justice. Additionally, researchers report high levels of user satisfaction and compliance, with agreements ranging from sixty to
ninety percent. Efficacy, as a measure of justice, is a more elusive concept, although ADR advocates conclude that such
mechanisms promote justice because they are more creative, participatory, and lead to democratic solutions.
Critics of alternative processes counter that ADR adds
another procedural layer (and associated costs) to dispute resolution, arguing that mediation merely creates an illusion of participation, voluntariness, and consensus. The central criticism
surrounds the privatism of mediation and the consequent reduction in publicity of that process. In other words, private parties,
under a promise of confidentiality, control the mediation process
and often the results to the exclusion of public involvement or
review. Thus, government sanctioned ADR to these critics is
simply another way of legitimizing private wealth transfers. S4
The ADR movement, however, particularly as evidenced
by reg-neg, offers a promising dispute resolution technology for
broadening participation in agency decisionmaking and policymaking. With such a promise, though, comes the associated
risk that ADR can reduce the public oversight in those
processes.

v.

CONCLUSION

Is greater public participation the proper regulatory
response to the "four failures" of the political economy? It may
well be argued that I have overstated my case about wider public
participation in agency activity as an antidote to distributive
injustice. A critic might assert that I am wrong as a matter of
theory, practice, and reality. Instead of complaining about the
imperfections of the democratic process, it may be propounded
that we accept them for what they are-imperfections in an
imperfect world. In addition, the critique continues, I should
resign myself to the reality that some small groups simply suffer
"relative disadvantage[s]" as a result of "accommodation[s] to
the political process."ss Such pragmatism has an apparent
attraction; the system works relatively well and is relatively
54. See Charles Ellison, Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory, SYSTEMATIC
ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE REsOLUTION (Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991).
55. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990).
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accessible. The reality, however, is difficult. Recent scholarship
and government reports indicate that practice correlates with
theory and that the dis empowered do, in fact, suffer disproportionate environmental harm. 56
If a disenfranchised group cannot adequately participate in
basic political and economic markets, and if constitutional and
legal rules are titled against it, then public participation seems
justified for at least four complimentary reasons. First, wider
participation performs an educative function, as agency decisionmakers hear both different and additional views of the subject matter of the regulation. 57 Second, for purposes of political
accountability, government should listen to viewpoints other
than those of the regulatee to avoid problems of capture, corruption, and the inefficient outcomes attendant with prisoner's
dilemma games. 58 Third, wider, more inclusive participation
serves a legitimating function, especially if, as is the normal case,
the regulatory activity is a form of private wealth transfer.
Finally, public participation helps satisfy the democratic ideal of
self-government, especially in light of the four noted failures.
While data collection and analysis will provide needed and necessary information, this response should be seen as suppletive to
a systemic change in an agency's political process. A seat at the
table must be set and new voices must be heard during the regulatory dinner conversation.

56. See sources cited supra note 8.
57. See GLEN o. ROBINSON, AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW 129-31 (1991).
58. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,

BUREAUCRACY:

PUBLIC CHOICE &

supra note 40, at 54-98.
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